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Abstract—Defining proper measures for evaluating the effec-
tiveness of an assurance model, which we have developed to
ensure cloud security, is vital to ensure the successful implementa-
tion and continued running of the model. We need to understand
that with security being such an essential component of business
processes, responsibility must lie with the board. The board must
be responsible for defining their security posture on all aspects
of the model, and therefore must also be responsible for defining
what the necessary measures should be. Without measurement,
there can be no control. However, it will be also be necessary to
properly engage with cloud service providers to achieve a more
meaningful degree of security for the cloud user.
Keywords—security; privacy; standards; compliance; assur-
ance; audit; measurement; cloud service providers; service level
agreements
I. INTRODUCTION
Achieving information security in the cloud is not a trivial
process. There are a great many challenges to overcome and,
with Pym, we addressed some of those in earlier work [1]
developing a conceptual model for cloud security assurance,
where we addressed three key challenges, namely standards,
proposed management method and complexity. In this current
work, we consider the importance of defining proper mea-
surement mechanisms to ensure the correct working of the
assurance model.
There are, of course, many other issues, and we discuss
some of these in Section II, where we look at the definition of
security goals, compliance with cloud security standards, audit
issues, the impact of management approaches on security, and
how complexity and the lack of responsibility and account-
ability affects cloud security. The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows: in Section III we give a brief overview
of how our framework operates; in Section IV we discuss
how the literature approaches measurement; In Section V we
discuss how we might go about developing metrics to measure
performance of the security goals of security and privacy. In
Section VI we address the remaining key issue to be tackled;
and in Section VII we discuss our conclusions.
II. THE CHALLENGES
There are a number of challenges which need to be
addressed in order to achieve the goal of good security. The
fundamental concepts of information security are confidential-
ity, integrity, and availability (CIA), a concept developed when
it was common practice for corporate management to run a
company under agency theory. We have all seen how agency
theory has failed to curb the excesses of corporate greed. The
same is true for cloud security, which would suggest a different
approach is needed. We address the following important points
in turn: definition of security goals, compliance with cloud
security standards, audit issues, the impact of management
approaches on security, and how complexity and the lack of
responsibility and accountability affects cloud security.
In looking at the definition of security goals, we have
recognised that the business environment is constantly chang-
ing, as are corporate governance rules and this would clearly
imply changing measures would be required. More emphasis
is now being placed on responsibility and accountability [2],
social conscience [3], sustainability [4][5], resilience [6] and
ethics [7].
Responsibility and accountability are, in effect, mecha-
nisms we can use to help achieve all the other security goals.
Since social conscience and ethics are very closely related, we
can expand the traditional CIA triad to include sustainability,
resilience and ethics. This expansion of security requirements
can help address some of the shortcomings of agency theory,
but also provides a perfect fit to stewardship theory. Steward-
ship carries a broader acceptance of responsibility than the self-
interest embedded in agency. This breadth extends to acting in
the interests of company owners and potentially society and
the environment as a whole.
On the matter of achieving compliance with standards in
practice, we have identified the use of assurance to achieve
security through compliance and audit. Turning first to com-
pliance, there are a number of challenges to address. Since
the evolution of cloud computing, a number of cloud security
standards have evolved, but the problem is that there is still no
standard which offers complete security — there is no “one
size covers all”, which is a limitation. Even compliance with all
standards will not guarantee complete security, which, presents
another disadvantage [8].
The pace of evolution of new technology far outstrips the
capability of international standards organisations to keep up
with the changes [9], adding to the problem and meaning
it may not be resolved any time soon. We have argued that
companies need to take account of these gaps in the standards
when addressing issues of compliance.
In [8], we have addressed the question of whether compli-
ance with standards, assurance and audit can provide security,
and in [10], we have addressed one of the fundamental
weaknesses of the standards compliance process.
Auditing in the accountancy world has enjoyed the benefit
of over a century of practice and experience, yet there remain
differences of opinion and a number of problems are yet
to be resolved. Duncan and Whittington [8] provide some
background on this issue. Cloud computing audit, can not
be considered a mature field, and there will be some way to
go before it can catch up with work done in the accounting
profession.
An obvious area of weakness arises when taking audit
professionals from the accounting world out of their comfort
zone, and placing them in a more technical field. Equally, the
use of people with a computing background can overcome
some of these issues, but their lack of audit background
presents another weakness. Clearly further research will be
needed in this area.
Looking at management approach, we would argue that a
shift from agency behaviour to a stewardship approach can
go a long way to reducing the major weaknesses inherent in
an agency approach to security in cloud ecosystems. We have
observed that cloud service providers (CSP)s have developed
their cloud business models using agency theory. Pallas et al
[11] suggest that agency theory models the current relationship
between CSPs and cloud users very well, further suggesting
this expresses all the weaknesses of agency and highlights
many of the issues still faced today.
Given the potential multiplicity of actors, and the complex-
ities of their relationships with each other in cloud ecosystems,
it is clear that simple traditional agency relationships (where
each actor looks to their own short term ends) will no longer
be able to handle fully the security implications for users of
these ecosystems.
There is a clear need for developing a stronger mechanism
to ensure users of such ecosystems can be assured of the
security of their information. In [12], we addressed the cloud
security issue with management method, and argue that the
historic reliance on agency theory to run companies can present
a barrier to effective security.
In considering complexity, we have observed that since
cloud computing was developed, the majority of security based
research has concentrated on providing technical solutions to
solve the security problem. While many excellent solutions
have been proposed, cloud security can never be achieved by
technical means alone. First, the core business architecture
comprises a combination of people, process and technology,
thus a solution which addresses only one of these key elements
will always be doomed to failure.
Second, a cloud user can take as many steps to secure their
business as they wish, but a key ingredient in the equation
is the fact that all cloud processes run on somebody else’s
hardware, and probably software too — the CSP’s. The cloud
relationship needs to include the CSP as a key partner in the
pursuit of achieving security. Unless and until CSPs are willing
to share this goal, technical solutions will be doomed to failure.
Third, the additional complexities which cloud brings into
the security equation must be recognised, and dealt with
appropriately. Increased complexity brings with it increased
risk. Simply put, complexity means that such relationships are
not easily analysed or disentangled. Thus, it is vital that effort
is put in to analysing and disentangling these relationships
fully in order to properly understand the risk involved. If this
risk is not recognised, and dealt with appropriately, this will
inhibit the possibility of achieving good security.
Currently, cloud users effectively have to treat cloud ser-
vices as a black box, since they have no control over what
goes on inside, or behind the scenes. This puts cloud users at
a singular disadvantage when it comes to issues of privacy and
security. Regulators are taking a far more aggressive approach
to breaches, and the cloud user is the one who ends up carrying
the can and getting the punitive fines issued by the regulator.
This leads to the issue of lack of responsibility and ac-
countability. Standard service level agreement (SLA) offer-
ings from the major players currently ignore accountability,
assurance, audit, confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy,
responsibility and security, merely offering availability as the
focus of their measure of performance. The onus for measuring
and proving unacceptable performance is neatly passed to the
customer, which, with the inclusion of some suitably deeply
buried clauses in the small print, assures the buck invariably
never stops with the CSP.
Companies who are cloud users are quite properly legally
held responsible and accountable to a variety of regulators
throughout industry under privacy and security regulations.
Fines for non-compliance are reaching punitive levels, and
many regulators have extreme levels of sanction at their
disposal. Yet, CSPs are not held to account for their often
not inconsiderable role in such failures!
This issue with CSP SLAs is not a trivial issue to address.
CSPs need to provide users with assurance, through compli-
ance and audit, that they can provide a level of service capa-
ble of meeting user requirements in confidentiality, integrity,
privacy and security. CSPs should be prepared to offer cloud
users performance guarantees in all their required areas, not
just on availability. CSPs need to become accountable to users
for meeting these requirements, by which means they will be
able to demonstrate a responsible and ethical approach to their
customers, and at the same time, providing an extremely robust
and dependable service to all cloud users.
We further argue that the CSPs should provide monitoring
tools to collect sufficient information to demonstrate that they
have achieved the required level of performance, rather than
leaving it for customers to find out when something goes
wrong. CSPs are much better placed to do this, since cloud
customers will not necessarily have access to all the systems
necessary for this to happen. We have further argued [13] that
this will require a significant change in attitude from the CSPs,
leading to the development of better security oriented SLAs,
which will improve the approach to security for all actors
within the cloud ecosystem.
This was the basis on which, with Pym, we developed
a conceptual framework for cloud security assurance[1], ex-
panding on earlier works [14][15], which seeks to address
the issues faced in trying to achieve security in the cloud,
and provides a more effective means for business to achieve
both cloud security assurance along with appropriate standards
compliance, by providing continuous assurance through both
compliance and audit.
We draw on natural resource management research [6][16]
which provides some very clear illustrations of the effective-
ness of stewardship, presenting a clear systems view of the
issues addressed. The framework we have proposed addresses
these key challenges facing cloud users.
III. HOW OUR FRAMEWORK OPERATES
Fig. 1. A Declarative Cloud Three-Dimensional Security Matrix
The framework functions by taking a 3 dimensional se-
curity approach to how the company is organised. On one
dimension there is the business architecture, which covers
people, process and technology; the second dimension covers
the security properties, which extends the traditional CIA
approach by adding sustainability, resilience and ethics; and
the third dimension is the systems architecture of the business,
which addresses the systems, services and applications used
by the business, to which we must add the cloud models of
infrastructure, platform and software as a service (IaaS), (PaaS)
and (SaaS). The framework then identifies and addresses
every point in the matrix where each of the three dimensions
intersect.
There are 4 stages of process involved in running the
model. There is the declarative stage, where management set
the goals to be achieved. Next the operational stage collects
data to measure how well the company is meeting these
declarative goals. Then, internal audit will provide assurance
through audit and compliance checks to confirm the integrity
of the process. Finally, external audit will essentially double
check that everything undertaken will have been compliant and
thus compliance with standards can be achieved, together with
the assurance that the declarative goals of management are
being met.
Thus, management need to determine their declarative
position on each of these intersecting points, and further, must
determine how performance will be measured. Management
are responsible for defining proper measurements and metrics
to be used in the framework, and this is what we will now
address.
IV. MEASUREMENT LITERATURE
Measurement mechanisms in accounting and management
are well understood and mature disciplines. These measure-
ment mechanisms, while not always trivial, are aided by the
common currency of such measures, namely money. Every
measure or metric used can be translated into financial terms,
which have long been well understood in these fields.
However, the recent development and emphasis of more
esoteric management methods, such as corporate social re-
sponsibility, sustainability, ethical behaviour and stewardship
have brought with them new challenges in respect of how
success can be measured. We see a similar problem arising
with cloud ecosystems, where issues of security, privacy,
sustainability, resilience, ethicality, accountability, auditability
and information stewardship also present new challenges in
respect of how to measure the success of these values.
Hahn et al [17], suggest the mainstream of the literature on
corporate sustainability follows the win-win paradigm, accord-
ing to which economic, environmental and social sustainability
aspects can be achieved simultaneously. The authors argue that
trade-offs and conflicts in corporate sustainability are the rule
rather than the exception, and propose an initial framework
for the analysis of trade-offs in corporate sustainability. They
further suggest the question of how such trade-offs can be
measured and managed has not been addressed widely.
Lindgreen and Swaen [18] suggest the research community
suffers from a lack of understanding of how to develop
corporate social performance measures. The authors analyse
how companies address these issues, and call for more research
in this area. Wood [19] reviews the literature on corporate
social performance measurement and sets that literature into
a theoretical context. The author emphasises the need for
scholars to refocus on stakeholders and society, incorporating
literature from other domains in the process.
Green and Peloza [20] seek to understand how consumers
define corporate social responsibility (CSR) and how it can
enhance the overall value proposition for consumers, but note
the inconsistency with which measurement metrics are applied
across industry, finding 39 difference metrics in their study.
The authors suggest a more explicit and precise measurement
of value customers receive in exchange value is needed.
Bodeau et al [21] describe the initial representative set
of cyber resiliency metrics identified by the assessment task
of the RAMBO project under the FY11 MITRE Innovation
Program. The authors suggest that this set of metrics is
expected to evolve in response to practical experience as well
as to the ongoing refinement of the cyber resiliency engineer-
ing framework. Carvalho et al [22], looking at supply chain
resilience, propose a conceptual framework for the analysis of
relationships between agile and resilient approaches, supply
chain competitiveness and performance. The authors propose
operational and economic performance measures to facilitate
the monitoring of the influence of these practices on supply
chain performance.
Looking at corporate sustainability, Christofi et al [23]
suggest that the newly created TBL (triple bottom line —
economic, environmental and social) reporting practices need
to undergo further standardisation and enforcement to avoid,
or give early warnings about, future corporate mismanage-
ment that leads to socio-economic consequences detrimental
to investors and consumers in general. The Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board [24] has been set up with this
purpose in mind.
Eccles et al [25], in looking at how to become a sustainable
company, suggest that companies need leadership commit-
ment, an ability to engage with multiple stakeholders along
the value chain, widespread employee engagement and disci-
plined mechanisms for execution. Rahman and Post [26], who
are looking at environmental corporate social responsibility
(ECSR), develop a transparent ECSR measure, with an explicit
coding scheme, that strictly relies on publicly available data.
Vieira et al [27] address resilience benchmarking for infor-
mation systems, and suggest resilience benchmarking merges
concepts from performance, dependability, and security. They
present an overview on the state-of-the-art on benchmarking
performance, dependability and security.
Delmas et al [28] ask what CSR ratings really capture. The
authors identify the principal components of corporate environ-
mental performance. They find corporate financial performance
to be associated with process but not with outcome measures.
Lee et al [29] develop a survey tool which organisations can
use to identify their strengths and weaknesses and to develop
and evaluate the effectiveness of their resilience strategies and
investments.
Linkov et al [30] focus on the development of measurable
resilience management systems for use in decision making
and government policy. The authors suggest that resilience
measurement must be advanced with the use of novel analytic
approaches that are complementary to, but readily distinguish-
able from those already identified with risk management.
Linkov et al [31] note that despite the national and international
importance of resilience metrics, used to inform management
decisions, the measures are still in the early stages of devel-
opment. The authors develop and organise effective resilience
metrics for cyber systems. These metrics link national policy
goals to specific system measures, such that resource allocation
decisions can be translated into actionable interventions and
investments. The authors have identified and assessed a number
of metrics using quantitative and qualitative measures found in
the literature. They have proposed a generic approach which
could integrate actual data, technical judgement, and literature-
based measures to assess system resilience across physical,
information, cognitive, and social domains.
Prior and Hagmann [32] note that a significant challenge
still lies in the accurate characterisation and quantification of
resilience, and thus also the ability to provide a systematic
basis for policy-making in resilience-based threat mitigation.
The authors maintain that resilience should not be reduced to
a methodological problem only, given that the methodological
operationalisation of resilience also connects with analytical
ideas of what and whose kind of responsibility should be
measured and political conceptions of who assumes what tasks
and responsibility in a resilience framework.
Eccles et al [33] investigate the effect of corporate sustain-
ability on organisational processes and performance, using a
sample of 180 US companies. The authors provide evidence
that high sustainability companies significantly outperform
their counterparts over the long-term, both in terms of stock
market as well as accounting performance. Ioannidis et al [34],
in addressing resilience in information stewardship, present
a mathematical model to measure resilience. Montiel and
Delgado-Ceballos [35] carry out a survey of CSR and show
that the CSR field is still evolving, with the use of different
approaches to define, theorise, and measure CSR. The authors
also find differences between the literature that targets scholars
versus the one targeting practitioners, and provide a set of
recommendations on how to advance the CSR field.
V. HOW TO DEVELOP USEFUL MEASUREMENTS
Defining a generic set of measures is unlikely to be useful,
since every business is different. This is a task for management.
However, we think it will be useful to provide some general
assistance by way of a few examples of how to go about it.
We will start by looking at each dimension in turn.
The business architecture breaks down into three main
areas, people, process and technology. Measuring people can
be relatively straightforward. Each employee has a unique
employee number, a unique computer access code and pass-
word, and access rights to whatever areas are appropriate for
carrying out their job. Some companies will already have elec-
tronic or biometric systems installed and functioning, others
might not, but identifying who is who ought to be relatively
straightforward. Most companies will have their processes well
documented with a unique reference number assigned to each
process.
While these processes may well have been documented for
a considerable period of time, it is important to recognise that
they may have been defined before security formed part of
the requirements. This should be recognised and appropriate
steps taken to address this. Technology, too, should be simple
enough, as each piece of technology, whether servers, desktop,
or mobile device will have a unique asset number, and internet
connectivity can be recorded via the unique media access
control (MAC) address inside the hardware, as well as the
internet protocol (IP) address used to connect to the network,
whether from inside the company, or from outside the company
via the internet.
Looking at systems next, each piece of technology will
have one or more operating systems, which will be identifiable.
There will be one or more services running on the equipment,
which will be identifiable, and there will be one or more
applications running on the equipment, all of which will be
identifiable. Where access to cloud systems is available, this
will be either at a high level, such as SaaS or some service
such as desktop as a service (DaaS), which can be identified.
Equally, if the access is to a lower level of service such as
PaaS or IaaS, this too can be identified. There may be multiple
systems accessed, operated by multiple providers, which may
also involve brokers or other service providers, all of which
can be identified.
This brings us to a more difficult area, the security prop-
erties. Confidentiality can be achieved by ensuring only the
correctly authorised people can be granted access to confiden-
tial information. This can be achieved by proper access control,
and monitoring. Integrity is slightly more challenging, as it is
technically more challenging to ensure that information, once
saved into a system has not been tampered with, particularly
in the case of databases.
However, this can be addressed by logging every change
made to every transaction within a system, logging who made
the change, when, from what location and so on. Thus each
change in the information state can be preserved, which would
allow recreation of the original if the change was malicious.
However, our requirement to address the new security
properties of sustainability, resilience and ethics presents the
biggest challenge. We could address sustainability of security
by using redundancy to ensure continuity of operations in
the event of some business disaster or major security breach.
This may involve an element of lost time due to set up and
configuration time needed to restore systems.
Resilience could be addressed by having a permanently
running system mirror which allows for an extremely rapid
recovery from unexpected shock. The additional costs of
addressing sustainability and resilience would need to be
considered. For business critical systems, the additional costs
of ensuring sustainability and resilience may end up providing
cheap insurance.
Ethics, which generally would include company approach
to corporate social responsibility, could be addressed by view-
ing how suppliers approach these issues, usually disclosed in
annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports or on the
company website.
Clearly CSPs who concentrate on availability in their
SLAs without considering accountability, assurance, audit,
confidentiality, compliance, integrity, privacy, responsibility
and security, thus leaving the cloud user to carry the can,
might well be considered as irresponsible and unethical in their
behaviour. The same might be said for companies who provide
poor service in other areas, such as outsourced activities which
might have an impact on security and privacy.
VI. ADDRESSING A CRITICAL REMAINING OBSTACLE TO
CLOUD SECURITY
We would like to think that there are no weaknesses in the
conceptual framework we have developed for cloud security
assurance. But to do so would be naı¨ve, as the framework
has been necessarily developed to address all aspects of
cloud security under the control of the company operating
the framework. Unfortunately, the very mechanism of cloud
computing means that not all areas are completely under the
control of the company operating the framework. At least one
or more companies involved in the cloud ecosystem will not
be under the control of the company operating the framework,
and this presents a key weakness.
There has been a great deal of research carried out into
cloud security, and much of this research proposes excellent
technical solutions. However, information security in the cloud
cannot be solved by technical solutions alone. Business oper-
ates through a combination of people, process and technology,
thus it is essential to approach security addressing all three
of these areas together. This also explains why much of the
research carried out in the field of cloud security will be
ineffective.
Our proposed framework addresses all three areas of peo-
ple, process and technology, yet is still not foolproof, and here
are some of the main reasons for this: CSP SLA limitations,
and unwillingness to change; The threat environment; Stan-
dards issues; Management reluctance to take security seriously.
One of the most important of these is the SLA between the
company and the CSP. It is no accident that the standard
SLA offerings from the major CSPs focus on availability.
Their business model is geared to providing availability as the
main service performance measure to which they purport to
be accountable.
Accountability, assurance, audit, confidentiality, compli-
ance, integrity, privacy, responsibility and security do not
feature in the standard SLA. It is important that companies
recognise that this represents the current status. Any additional
requirements must be negotiated directly with the CSP.
Another key area to be considered is the magnitude of
the threat environment. Companies are bound by legislation,
sometimes regulation, the need to comply with standards,
industry best practice and are accountable for their actions.
The bad guys have no such constraints. They are completely
free to bend every rule in the book, do whatever they want, ma-
nipulate, cajole, hack or whatever it takes to get to the money.
Also, there are a lot of them out there. Many have different
agendas, different skills levels, capabilities and resources at
their disposal. Between them all, they can attack 24/7, 365
days a year. They don’t work to rule, go home at 5:00pm,
take weekends off or go on holiday, at least not until they
have relieved you of your cash, and in that case there are
plenty more happy to take their place. In addition to which,
[36] suggest that over 200,000 new malware threats are being
developed globally every day.
Companies who have achieved compliance with a cloud
security standard often think they can sit back and relax.
They need to think again! There is currently no such thing
as a comprehensive cloud security standard, and there pos-
sibly never will be. Technology develops so fast, and the
standards process, especially for international standards, is so
cumbersome that by the time a standard is finally agreed and
published, it is likely to be out of date. Sometimes there
is a reluctance on the part of management to take security
seriously. It is often seen as a technical issue passed to the
IT department. Proper security can never be achieved using
technical means alone. Business operates with a combination
of people, process and technology, not technology alone. Thus
it is vital to factor in the impact that all three will have on
achieving and maintaining proper security. This needs to be
driven from the top. Management need to be fully aware that
it is not simply a technical issue, rather it is a fundamental
business process which needs to be driven right from the top
of the organisation. Information security now presents one of
the largest risks facing business today and needs to be given
the proper attention and commitment it deserves.
We are concerned about developing proper metrics for the
six security goals of our proposed security assurance model.
This will not be a trivial exercise and clearly we cannot
do justice to all these areas within the space of this paper.
Accordingly, we will address each of these areas individually
during the next year as part of our ongoing research.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have looked at some of the challenges facing companies
who seek to obtain good cloud security assurance. We have
seen how weaknesses in standard CSP SLAs can impact on
cloud security. We have identified issues with cloud security
standards, and how that might impact on cloud security. We
have considered how the lack of accountability can impact
on security. We have briefly outlined how our cloud security
assurance framework operates, and have discussed how the
above issues must additionally be addressed.
In looking at measurement literature, we see how some
aspects are quite mature and well understood, but that more
modern methods of management such as sustainability, re-
silience and ethics present new challenges due to the dearth
of research in these areas. In looking at how our framework
operates, we have discussed how the best security approach
needs to consider not just a technical solution, but must address
people, process and technology.
We have touched on how these difficult areas of security
might be approached as part of a comprehensive security
solution based on our proposed framework. Clearly, companies
could benefit from further research in several of these areas,
and in particular, measurement. However, we would caution
that action is needed now, not several years down the line when
research reaches a more complete level of success in these
areas. The threat environment is too dangerous. Companies
have to act now to try to close the door, otherwise it may be
too late.
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